Inheritances, divorces or liquidations of companies require that a common asset is divided among the entitled parties. Legal methods usually consider the market value of goods, while fair division procedures take into account the parties' preferences expressed as cardinal utilities. We combine the two practices to define two procedures that optimally allocate goods with market values to people with preferences.
Each player is given the list of goods and an equal number of points to distribute among them. He or she assigns a value to each good and submits it sealed to an arbiter.
When dealing with the division of a patrimony, however, we note that when parties allocate points to items to express their likes and dislikes, the market value of the disputed items involved cannot be ignored. This happens, among other causes, because if no agreement between the parties is found, items can always be sold to third parties, and the collected money will be shared between the parties. Therefore, when an agent allocates points to a good, two pieces of information are conveyed:
• The degree of pleasantness/unpleasantness of the item for the agent • The market value of the good.
We will disentangle to the two effects by proposing alternative ways for expressing cardinal utilities:
1. Utility is expressed by bids: How much an agent would be willing to pay for a good, or how much he would be willing to receive for a bad.
2. Since, the utility points convey two different pieces of information, two different types of measurement are used for each item: a) An objective market value agreed upon by all agents, and b) an individual rating by each agent.
The first procedure is deeply indepted to the works of Eisenberg [10] Gale [11] , and, more recently, by Bogomolnaia, Moulin, Sandomirskiy and Yanovskaya [4] and [5] regarding, among other things, the connection between the Nash solution of bargaining problems and equilbrium prices.
The second procedure has an important precedent in the Asset Divider procedure by Bellucci [3] (see also [1] ) that first combined preferences and market value to output an allocation that is, in the intentions of the authors, fair and equal in the market values of the bundles. This method "uses a modified version of the Adjusted Winner algorithm developed by Brams and Taylor [7] , to divide indivisible goods between two parties as fairly as possible. [...] Two sets of ratings [...] symbolise how important the item is to the party. [While] Asset Divider also accepts the current monetary value of each item in dispute"
While the essential data processed by their method and ours may be similar, the way it is processed is inherently different. We list the main differences:
1. Asset Divider uses a step-by-step procedure in which items are allocated once during the process and the allocation is final, without checking whether the whole allocation is optimal in the end. Our procedures allocates all goods at once, making sure that the allocation is optimal under well-defined criteria.
2. Asset Divider looks for an acceptable solution. In Belluccis [3] words:
Our goal is to provide feasible suggested solutions to the conflict that are acceptable to the user, which for our purposes does not involve searching for optimal solutions as in Pareto optimisation. We have found such techniques are difficult to use in our domain. The best we can arrive at computationally fair solutions is to ensure are solutions are acceptable (i.e. approximately optimal or fair solutions).
Our goal instead is to overcome the difficulties highlighted above and frame the problem in a solid mathematical background that allows the inclusion of the most recent scientific advances in the field of mathematics, economics and computer science. Our procedure uses clear cut optimization techniques that are easy to use in the current domain.
3. By properly setting our optimality criterion, we address (and overcome) an impossibility result which states that divisions providing equal market shares may result in too many split items. Our procedure always guarantees the minimal number of split items, which is given by the number of agents involved in the division, minus 1 (and it therefore reduces to 1 when 2 agents are involved) 4. The two procedures satisfy different properties. The Asset Divider procedure enjoys a scale invariance property: if the all the ratings by a player are multiplied by a constant, the outcome is the same. Our procedure is translation invariance: If all the ratings are increased, or decreased by the same amount, say a star, the outcome is unchanged. This property has proved very easy to convey to the audiences of specialists in the legal area of research.
5.
Last but not least, our procedure works for any number of agents. The Asset Divider procedure works only for two agents.
The procedures have been set up while working for the CREA project: a two-year project funded by the E-Justice program of the European Union, which saw the collaboration of law, mathematics and computer science researchers, together with Stakeholder Associations, from eight countries in the European Union.
Notation and Assumptions
We consider a (finite) set of q valuable items A (which we refer to as goods) to be divided among a (finite) set N of n agents. The share of good a assigned to agent i is denotes as z ia ∈ [0, 1]. For each i ∈ N , the vector
denotes agent i's allocation. The entire allocation is grouped as a matrix z = (z 1 , . . . , z n ). Only one specimen per good is distributed and, since receiving the good or part of it provides utility for at least an agent, allocations that assign the entire good to one or more agents are considered. Those allocations are called feasible and the set of such allocations is denoted as
Typically, no pair of agents values the same good equally. The degree of appreciacion for good a ∈ A by agent i ∈ N is described by a non negative number u ia ≥ 0, conveniently arranged in vectors u i = (u i1 . . . , u iq ) T ∈ R A + and then in a matrix u = (u 1 , . . . , u n ). A division problem is then fully characterized by the triplet Q = (N, A, u). We assume now that utilities are addiitve (the utility of receiving a bundle of goods equals the sum of the utilities of the single goods) and linear (the utility of receiving the fraction of a good equals the same fraction of the utility for receiving the good in its entirety). Consequently, a feasible allocation z will give a utility of U i (z) = u i · z i = a z ia u ia for agent i ∈ N . Let U (z) = (U 1 (z), . . . , U n (z)) T be the utility profile corresponding to an allocation and let U(N, A, u) be the set of utility profiles corresponding to feasible allocations. Notice that the utililty of receiveing the entire asset need not be the same for all the agents. In other words, utilities are not normalized.
Which allocation?
What makes an allocation fair? The question does not come with an easy answer, and this is what makes the whole topic appealing. Often, the proposed allocation stands out as the, possibly unique, solution of a social welfare function which measures the agents' global satisfaction. Among the many proposals, two functions convey an idea of fairness particularly well, and the have resurfaced over and over in the specific literature for theory and applications:
• The Egalitarian solution (which derives from the Egalitarian Equivalent allocation by Pazner and Schmeidler [17] ) defined as
whereŪ i (z) = U i (z) a u ia is the normalized utility for agent i ∈ N . The solution name comes from the fact that, under mild conditions such as the requirement that every good has some positive value for every agent, i.e. u ia > 0 for every i ∈ N and a ∈ A, it turns out (see Corollary 5.8 in [8] ) that the solution guarantees equal normalized utility for all agents, namelyŪ
• The Competitive/Nash solution (after Nash [16] ) defined as
Nash introduced this solution in the context of bargaining problems. The solution is also referred to as competitive because it can be obtained as a competitive equilibrium in the exchange economy where each agent is endowed with an equal amount of money. We will return to this notion in a later section.
As we may expect, no criterion prevails over the other. First of all, we notice that both solutions satisfy the following invariance by scale property:
suppose that the utility profile of each agent is multiplied (scaled) by some constant λ i > 0 for every i ∈ N , i.e., u ia = λ i u ia for every i ∈ N and a ∈ A then (N, A, u) and (N, A, u ) yield the same solution sets.
In case of the Egalitarian solution, this is true because we are considering normalized utilities in the objective function. For the Nash/Competitive one, we have that U i (z) = λ i U i (z), and thus the objective functions of the two problems Q = (N, A, u) and Q = (N, A, u ) simply differ by a constant.
The Egalitarian and the Competitive/Nash solutions share other important properties, such as:
• Fair Share Guarantee: everyone is guaranteed at least her fair share of the entire asset. In formulas
• Efficiency: The allocation implements an efficient utility profile, a vector U of utility values that is not Pareto dominated, i.e. it cannot be improved upon, agent by agent, by another allocation. In formulas
The two solutions differ in the fulfillment of other important properties: As already stated, the egalitarian solution, under mild conditions, satisfies (2), while the Competitive/Nash one typically fails the same test. Conversely, the latter always satisfies
In words, every agent values the received bundle of items at least as much as the bundles assigned to the other agents.
The egalitarian solution always satisfies the same property, but may fail to do so when the number of agents increases to 3 or more (see [9] ). The comparison may continue and we refer to [5] and [15] for a recent and thorough comparison of the two solution in the linear setting adopted here and in more general frameworks. The Competitive/Nash solution enjoys many solidarity properties such as Resource Monotonicity (A more valuable asset should correspond to a better share for all agents) and Population Monotonicity (A smaller number of competing agents should correspond to a better share for all the remaining agents). On the other hand, the Egalitarian solution is more intuititve and performs better in specific contexts such as the division of bads. More than championing any of the two solutions a priori, we will show that a solution may stand out based on the assumptions and the data available for any instance.
All the above definitions and results hold for agents having equal importance, but can be asily adapted to situations where agents are endowed with different entitlements or weights w i > 0, i ∈ N .
The procedure without agreed upon market values
We begin with a division procedure where agents do not have an agreement on the market value of the goods to be assigned, because they tried, but have not reached an agreement or, more simply, because the topic has not been discussed yet. The procedure requires the intervention of a mediator for the preliminary steps: the definition of a range of reasonable bids for every single good and a budget that the agents will use to make bids on every good of the asset. Notice that, if the agents are in good terms with each other, they may jointly proceed with these preliminary steps, thus making the intervention of the mediator unnecessary.
The main idea of the procedure is to ask the agents to make bids on all the goods using the available budget. The bid on a good should reflect the liking of that good, with a higher, lower resp., offer reflecting a willingness to get, renounce resp., the item. If b ia denoted the bid of agent i for good a, we will equate the utility of the good to this bid
An important feature of the procedure is that the bids are private and should not be communicated among the agents. Agents should therefore evaluate the goods exclusively according to their own bids. In this perspective, an important feature that the proposed solution should possess is No Envy. The Competitive/Nash solution becomes the natural candidate for this procedure. There is, however, another no less important reason to pick this solution: It defines equilibrium prices which can be posted (as opposed to the private bids) and according to which the bundle received by each agent coincides with the rational choice to be made when she actually spends one n-th of the total budget. The procedure works as follows:
"Fix Your Own Price" procedure i. A mediator defines a. An available budget B is given to each player b. A range of reasonable offers for each good.
c. The mediator also decides whether to communicate these ranges to the agents ii. Each agent distributes the budget as reasonable bids over the goods. The bids are not revealed to the other agents.
iii. The Competitive/Nash solution for divisible goods is computed
The definition of ranges for the bids, though not strictly necessary, is useful for limiting the insurgence of strategic behavior: An agent who knows that a good is particularly appreciated by other agents may be tempted to make a null bid in order to save that part of the budget in its entirety for other bids. The decision on whether to reveal the value of reasonable bids to the agents is up to the mediator. On one hand, if agents know the range they may better calibrate the bids. Knowing the range, however, may induce the agents to place their bids on the bounds of the range and this may be problematic -especially if more than one bid is placed on the upper bound. In such a case, ties must be broken, and this greatly increases the number of available solutions to choose from, up to a point where too many alternatives make the choice hard. A reasonable range for good a may come in the form of a finite interval [b a , b a ] or an unbounded interval [b a , ∞] in which only the lower bound is specified.
In principle, imposing a common budget for all the agents would not be necessary for the implementation of this procedure. In fact, each agent could simply declare a personal bid for every good with no constraints over the sum. The definition of a fixed budget (common or not), however, effectively conveys the notion that raising (lowering, resp.) the bid on a good reduces (increases, resp.) resources for bidding on other goods.
A simple way to determine the endpoints is the following: Fix a plausible tentative value for each good, compute the budget as the sum of these values, and define the interval of reasonable bids by decreasing and increasing (if required) the value, say 30% below and above it, respectively.
Our experience with putting the procedure in practice, reveal that agents may find difficult to balance the bids so to use the whole budget or, conversely, they may find the amount insufficient to complete the bidding. Instead of manually adjusting the bids, which may alter the proportions, and therefore the actual relevance of the goods, the system should provide a scaling option that allows the bids to automatically adjust to the available resources.
More ammunitions to the Nash solution
Some properties of the Nash solution have already been listed. The solution guarantees no envy: each agent compares the received bundle with those assigned to the other agents, and, according to the private bids, each agent thinks she made the better deal. Moreover the solution is efficient (no arrangement that globally improves the satisfaction of agents is possible) and scale invariant: providing an agent with a larger budget will not make that agent any better off. Among the other features of the solution, one is particularly suited in this context: The Nash solution coincides with a market equilbrium allocation where agents spend a budget, equal for all of them, on the goods priced in such a way that no good is over-or underdemanded. The striking coincidence dates back to the works of Gale [11] and Eisenberg [10] . This result has been recently elaborated on and extended to the cases of allocation of liabilities/chores, denoted as bads, or to the mixed allocation of goods and bads, by Moulin et al. in [5] . To highlight this dual definition, the solution is now referred to as Competitive/Nash.
In the definition of the competitive equilibrium, it is assumed that all budgets are set to one, with prices defined accordingly. An explicit formulation for the equilibrium prices are given in the main theorem of [5] . When utilities equate the bids, those prices can be suitable scaled to work with individual budgets amounting to B/n:
The setting of these prices give an alternative explanation for the Nash solution as a market situation with clearing prices. In fact, once the prices have been posted, we may figure that agents act as follows:
a. Each agent has 1 n-th of the total budget b. Each agent compares his bids with the prices and i. Rules out all the goods with price higher than the bid ii. Among the goods with prices lower than the bid, he starts buying, starting from the good with highest rebate (discount) iii. Until the budget ends
The main Theorem in [5] allows us to conclude that, when prices are defined by (6), all goods will be sold with no demand left unsatisfied, i.e. the market clears, and the allocation coincides with the Nash solution.
In the above procedure, we assumed that no agent will ever buy goods at prices higher than the bids. Moreover, prices are consistent with the initial budget B. This is explained by the following result. Proposition 1. The prices defined in (6) are such that, if agent follow the market procedure, i) no agent will pay more than his bid and ii) the sum of these prices equals the budget B.
Proof. According to Lemma 2 in [5] , prices, when agents have budgets of 1 euro each, can be defined as
where
Since each agent is asked to distribute a budget B as bids over the goods. U i will denote the "personal" value of the goods (or shares) received. Since the CEEI/Nash solution satisfies the Fair Share Guarantee, we have
When it comes to explaining the equilibrium prices, we may think of agents having now a budget B/n to spend. Prices have to be scaled up accordingly.
is one of the agents receiving good a in equilibrium, by (8) .
which proves i). Regarding ii) we simply note that, by the clearing property of the equilibrium market prices in the original setting
An application to inheritance
Most of the units working in the European project took care of the legal aspects of the problem. These units listed 36 different concrete cases in the areas of family law (inheritance and divorce) and company law (liquidation) that could benefit from the tools being developed in this context. Here is one of the inheritance cases submitted:
During his life, X was the owner of a land plot in a Seaside Town with a building and garden with three flats: one on the ground floor (90m2), one on the first floor (60m2) and one on the second floor with a wonderful view of the shore and beach (60m2). All flats were condominiums and were rented out. He also owned another land plot in the Capital City with a building with three flats; one on the ground floor (55m2), one on the first floor (55m2, where X lived) and one on the second floor (45m2, but needs full renovation). This second building was not condominium.
After death of person X he is succeeded by his sons, A, B and C.
A is most interested in the ground floor because he operates a mechanics workshop which is crucial for his livelihood. He wouldnt mind getting another apartment either in the Capital City or in a Seaside Town.
B already had a house so he was interested in the house in the Seaside Town. He wants two flats, the one on the first floor but especially the one on the second floor (this is his mayor priority).
C has a tourist agency and he wants all flats in the Seaside Town.
A mediator could provide a rough guess of the properties' values based on standard per sq. meter estimate ranges provided by real estate authorities. The remarks on the properties' conditions help position the pointwise estimates within the range of possible values (k = * 1000): The same mediator could set a budget of 630k Euros (the values listed in the description actually sum up to 632k Euros, but we preferred to give a rounder number) and could also set the minimum bids as the estimated values decreased by 20%: The following bids are compatible with the preferences inferred by the short description on the problem. 170k  112k  123k  100k  80k  45k  630k  B  181k  132k  156k  61k  64k  36k  630k  C  200k  129k  140k  61k  64k  36k  630k The Competitive/Nash solution is given by:
Three arguments can be used to promote the solution among agents. The allocation is:
1. Efficient: no allocation that simultaneously improves the utility of all agents is possible;
2. Envy-free: Each agents receives the better share when goods are evaluated according to the personal bids;
3. An equilibrium from Equal Incomes: Prices can be defined that support the suggested solution as a market equilibrium.
The results regarding envy-freeness can be summarized by the following table, where the different valuations are described in the rows and the allocations are reported in the columns: The valuations of agent A are listed in the first row. That agent values the three flats received as the sum of the respective bids: 100k, 80k and 45k, yielding 225k Euros. Agent A values the bundles given to B (The second floor and 68% of the first floor in the Seaside Town) and to C (The ground floor and 32% of the first floor in the Seaside Town), 191.3k Euros and 213.7k Euros, respectively. Agent A has no reason to envy agent B or agent C. A similar reasoning applies to the other two agents whose valuation of the received bundle (bold in the table) exceeds that of the bundles assigned to the other agents.
We remark that bids are personal and do not represent objective evaluations. For this reason, a comparison between the values in the main diagonal of Table 4 may induce some agents to complain over having obtained lower values than other agents. In order to avoid any complaint, we recommend that bids are kept private, and each agent has no access to everybody else's valuations.
To explain the solution as an equilibrium, we note that the procedure is capable of computing the following prices for the properties: To explain the equilibrium we can envision the agents engaged to buy the properties at the posted prices, each one possessing a budget of 210k Euros, one third of the estimated total value of the whole asset. Each agent will orient his purchases based on the divergences between the personal bids and the posted prices. For instance, Agent A's comparison is shown in the next table: Agent A rules out all the flats in the Seaside Town, whose prices exceed his own bids, and starts buying the apartment on the first floor in the Capital City because it is the one with the highest discount, relative to his own bids. He pays 74.5k Euros and has 135.5k Euros remaining as budget. He than turns his attention to the apartment on the second floor and uses 42k Euros. The budget decreases to 93.5k Euros. Just enough money to buy the ground floor apartment in the same building.
A similar comparison is made by agent B, as shown in the next table: This agent first buys the apartment on the second floor in the Seaside Town and, with the remaining budget he cannot buy a share of 68% of the apartment on the first floor in the Seaside Town.
Finally, Agent C's valuations are summarized in the next table Agent C will therefore buy the ground floor apartment in the Seaside Town, at the posted price of 174k Euros and the remaining budget will allow him to buy the remaining 32% share of the first floor apartment in the same building, that Agent B could not afford to buy. This is an illustration of how the Nash solution can be obtained as a market equilibrium via the posted prices mechanism. 
The procedure with agreed upon market values
We now explore a second setting in which the goods' market value is given and it is accepted by the agents involved. Differences in the valuations among the agents still exist and they will result in subjective modifications of the market value of each single good, which may increase or decrease depending on the degree of appreciation by every single agent.
Elicitation of preferences typically requires careful balance between the precision in the specification of the agents' priorities and the simplicity in the definition of rules that can be understood by a vast audience of nonspecialists, with no background in matematics or economics.
The method that we propose supports the latter feature, while maintaining, under some proper assumptions, a sufficient degree of the former. It recurs to an ancient and intuitive method, which is knowing a recent revamp in popularity: that of a rating system induced by the repetition of a given symbol, typically a star. The method dates back to an 1820 guidebook by Mariana Starke [21] . Since then it has been used by critics to grade artworks (books, movies, theatrical performances,. . .) or by travellers or institutions to evaluate facilities (hotels, restaurants,. . .). More recently, it has become a popular method used by major internet goods and services retailers (such as Amazon, eBay or TripAdvisor) to let customer provide feedback on their consumption experience for other customers to make more informed decisions. We are confident that such pervasivity should make every potential user of the procedure at ease.
Typically, an odd number of symbols is adopted, with a median grade denoting neutrality. In the context of fair division, a rating system could be given the following interpretation.
We believe that a rating system with 5 levels is rich enough for most purposes: it encompasses the 3 level system (an agent who only wants to distinguish among appreciated (neutral, depreciated, resp.) goods could use Table 9 : An interpretation of the ratings stars rating meaning 1 strongly prefers to leave the good 2 mildly prefers to leave the good 3
neutral about the good 4
mildly prefers to take the good 5 strongly prefers to take the good a restricted rating of 5 stars (3 stars, 1 star, resp.). Giving the maximum rating for a good, will certainly increase the chances of receving that good, but it will not grant any ownership right about it. This happens because other agents may give similar maximum ratings, but most of all because there is no restriction on the total number of stars to be assigned by a player over all the goods (other that the number of levels adopted). Rather, an invariance principle should hold to encourage agents in revealing a profile of preferences rather than abunding with the stars in the vain hope of receiving a richer share than that of the others.
The notion of scale invariance, though sound in principle, is elusive in its application. Each agent should be able to (mentally) scale up or down a profile of prefences by a constant factor in order to be able to compare different sets of utilities. In the case of a discrete range of ratings and, a fortiori, with such a limited number of levels, the principle becomes impossible to implement. We devise a formula for linking ratings to utilities in which when the rating is median coincides with the market value, and each star added or removed correspond to the multiplication or divison of that market value by a constant factor. In fact, we will consider the following formula valid for each agent i ∈ N and each good a ∈ A:
where m a is the market value of good a, r ia is the rating by agent i of good a and K > 1 is the constant multiplicative factor. Instead of scale invariance, the rating system satisfies the following:
Translation invariance Adding or removing one star to the ratings of all of the goods will not change the outcome.
The principle applies to fractions of stars, if these are allowed by the system. To exemplify, according to translation invariance, the profiles in Table 10 yield the same outcome. Considering a more extreme case, all of the profiles described in Table  11 , indicate indifference over the goods. In other words, adding too many stars will result in an expression of indifference among goods. What counts, instead, is a right profiling, where an agent is able to indicate which are the goods that she really cares for.
Which objective?
Once the utility of all the agents have been defined, we should pick an allocation with the following properties: (i) It is fair in the Nash, Egalitarian or in any other scale invariant optimality criterion, and (ii) it provides bundles of equal market values (or proportional to the shares of entitlement) to te agents. The following example shows the the fulfillment of both objectives may come at a cost which is undue in situations where assets should be divided in a neat way and the number of split items should be kept to a minimum. Example 1. Consider two agents: A and B who are dividing 4 Marylin Monroe prints by Andy Warhol between themselves. The market value of the portraits is set to 100 dollars each, but each print has different background colors which modify the liking of the two agents. Here, the constant multiplying factor is set to K = 1.1. The following picture shows the range of utility values corresponding to all possible allocations of the goods (known as Indivisual Pieces Set (IPS) in Barbanel's monograph [2] ). As shown in Figure 1 , by the symmetry of this set and the indifference curves for both the Nash and the Egalitarian objectives, a fair allocation must yield a utility level of 222.8 for both agents. Such optimal level and an equal market value for the bundles received by the two agents is achieved by the following allocation: This solution has two paintings equally split between the two agents. It is fairly easy to show that no arrangement with at most one split painting achieves the same level of utility for both agents, while maintaining an equal market value for both agents.
The fact that in the example an allocation that is simultaneously fair and assigning bundles of equal market value requires two items to be split is at odds with one well known fact regarding the division of homogenous and divisible goods, namely the fact that any Pareto efficient profile deriving from the division of goods among n agents can be obtained by splitting at most n − 1 goods. In Example 1, this fact implies that all points on the Pareto efficient frontier (the thick border on the IPS in Figure 1 ) can be obtained by splitting at most one good, and proves the following statement. 
Our Proposal
Proposition 2 provides a strong argument for rejecting any procedure aiming at satisfying fairness and perfect equality in market values, for instance by searching a maximally fair allocation among those that return perfect equality in the market values by means of constrained optimization techniques. The cost of indicating a solution with too many split items may prove too high -especially in case of bitter disputes where the agents' main goal is to minimize the opportunities for contention after the division has been arranged (and each split item calls for an agreement between the involved agents). We solve the dilemma by proposing the egalitarian allocation The procedure works as follows:
"Price and Rate" procedure i. A mediator defines: a. The market value for each good;
b. The rate of appreciation for each additional star in the rating (The parameter K > 1 in our model).
ii. Each agents expresses a personal appreciation over each good with a five-star rating scale.
iii. The Egalitarian solution is computed.
Our first simulations reveal that setting K = 1.1 is a reasonable choice, and this can be set as the system default value.
In principle, equalizing the agents' utilities may not seem the wisest choice because it requires the comparison of interpersonal utility -a highely debated and questioned principle. In the present situation, however, agents' utilities are magnifications or contractions of the goods' market values and an allocation with equal (normalized) agents' utilities yields bundles of approximately equal market values for everyone, exact equality being problematic -as Example 1 shows. A more detailed analysis reveals that differences in the bundles' market values can be explained in terms of the agents' satisfaction per unit of monetary value received. More in detail: if an agents gets a larger share than that of another agent in terms of market value, the average rating of the former will be lower than that of the latter.
In order to make the agents' ratings comparable, these have to be standardized. In fact, agents have no constraints over the total number of stars to distribute over all goods (although, as explained above, abounding with high ratings is a backfiring strategy), therefore, a standardization over a central value is needed. We will not consider the common arithmetic mean, but a value that will enable the interpersonal comparison of utilities. Definition 1. We define the central rating for agent i ∈ N as the number ρ i such that
The standardized rating of good a ∈ A for agent i ∈ N is defined by r ia −ρ i , and the standardized utility of good is
When the standardized utility is used, receiving all goods guarantees every agent an utility equal to the total market value of the whole asset.
The following result helps computing the average rating for each agent. 
where ln is the natural logarithm (with base e).
Proof. By the properties of powers, equation (11) definingρ can be written as:
Multiplying both sides by Kρ i we get:
Taking logarithms on both sides, first with base K and then with base e, we getρ
last equality deriving from the properties of the logarithm and the change of base formula.
Instead of assessing the overall (normalized) utility of an allocation, an agent can evaluate two indices: Definition 2. The market value µ i (z) of the bundle received by agent i ∈ N is defined as
and the average standardized utility of the bundle,ū i (z), is defined as
The following relationship holds
An index that is easier to interpret than the average standardized utility is the following: Definition 3. The gain over the central rating for agent i is defined as:
The following result clarifies the inverse relationship between the market values and the average standardized rating -or utility for two agents. Theorem 1. Suppose z * is an optimal egalitarian allocation and i, h ∈ N .
The same holds true when all the inequalities are reversed, or they are replaced by the equal sign.
Proof. If z * is an optimal egalitarian allocation, then
Now, for any allocation z
The first equality is given by the definition ofŪ i (z), the second equality is obtained by multiplying numerator and denominator by (K) 3−ρ i , and the third inequality is a consequence of the definition ofρ i . Equations (17) and (18) imply
Now µ i (z * )/w i > µ h (z * )/w h if and only if
The fact that ln(x) ln(K) is a strictly increasing function in x explains the second "iff" link. All the above arguments can be repeated by reversing the inequalities, or by replacing them with the equality sign.
In the light of the above result we get back to the simple example and apply our solution. The first example deals with a divorce. 
A symmetry argument shows that another solution is obtained if the Pink painting is assigned to agent A and the Blue painting is split so that a share of 0.1585 (0.8415, resp.) goes to Agent A (Agent B, resp.). If we compare market shares with average standardized ratings, we notice that the smaller market share received by Agent A is compensated by a larger gain over the central rating for the same agent. 
Legal applications
We proceed with two examples proposed by the Legal Workgroup of the European project. Since the descriptions of the agents' preferences were rather succinct, we enriched them with some additional elements. If agents were explicitly asked to rate the single goods, such fictional integration would not be needed.
Application to divorce
A, wife of B, asks for the statement of termination of the civil effects of the marriage, three years having passed since the judgment of personal separation. We suppose that the wife is interested in the family house and has some interest in the seaside resort apartment, while the husband has agreed to live in the inherited apartment Money (item 8) be either considered as an item of the division or it can be distributed in equal parts between the parties. We opt for the second option and, therefore, it is distributed equally to the two parties prior to any other assignment.
Based on the short description, we figured out the ratings of the two parties: The following indices help define the quality of the division as perceived by the two agents: As expected, the larger market share obtained by A, is compensated by a slightly lower average standardized rating. We note that the sum of money given to the two agents at the beginning of the procedure could be used to assign the only split item to one of the agents. It seems reasonable for agents A to buy the smaller share originally assigned to B.
Application to Company Law
The second example considers the liquidation of a company in which the three partners are entitled to different shares.
A, B and C concluded a partnership contract in 2006, agreeing to contribute their work and/or property to achieve a common objective a small carpentry factory and a store for selling goods. They had different stakes/contributions which would determine their shares as joint owners. A was a carpenter with experience especially in kitchens and bedrooms. He contributed equipment (valued at 35000 euros) and of course with his know-how and experience. B had business premises large enough for the factory and for the store, and this was his contribution. C contributed in cash 30000 euros. After the financial crisis, the business began to deteriorate so person B proposed to change the purpose of their business to stocking and selling electronic appliances which would be directly imported from China. B still thinks that he is the only one who can decide about the purpose of the business premises. A was disappointed because they didnt need him or his work anymore. C only cares about profit. The content of their common asset (joint ownership) changed during the decade. They bought new machinery but they also had a special website for selling furniture with the possibility of on-line interior design as an additional service. To set up this website they had to spend 4500 euros and they pay 1200 euros monthly for software licenses and website maintenance fees. They decided to dissolve the joint ownership and the first step that court had to make was determining their shares. The court decided that A has 3/9, B has 5/9 and C 1/9 of the business. By determination of their shares joint-ownership was transformed into co-ownership. At the dissolution of co-ownership (in May 2016) the assets consist of all of the above mentioned but also includes new machinery (valued at 20000 Euros, store items valued at 30000 euros, and a profit of 15000 Euros).
In the process of partitioning co-ownership, A wants all machinery, but also a part of the property where the factory was located because he wants to continue running the same business by himself. B wants a part of the profits to start with his idea and all business premises. He is also interested in the website because he wants to sell online. C is interested in money only and proposes to sell the business as a whole.
The three partners agree on a value of 25000 euros for the website. Also, agents agree to leave money as one of the disputed items. Here is a list of the items, their value and ratings by the partners compatible with their statements.
The central ratings arē The following indices characterize the division. As guaranteed by Theorem 1, whereas in the market value over the weight ratio A ranks first, B second and C third, this order is totally reversed when the gain over central rating is considered. In particular, C will discount the fact of receiving her most treasured item with a lower share of goods in terms market value.
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